On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union

We study the determination of a common external tariff for African customs unions, using the case of the EAC. We use trade and tariff data at the HS6 level and a multi-sector multi-country computable general equilibrium model with the consistent tariff aggregator. We assume that the optimal common e...

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Main Authors: Bouët, Antoine, Laborde Debucquet, David, Traoré, Fousseini
Format: Conference Paper
Language:Inglés
Published: Global Trade Analysis Project 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/143021
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author Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Traoré, Fousseini
author_browse Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Traoré, Fousseini
author_facet Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Traoré, Fousseini
author_sort Bouët, Antoine
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description We study the determination of a common external tariff for African customs unions, using the case of the EAC. We use trade and tariff data at the HS6 level and a multi-sector multi-country computable general equilibrium model with the consistent tariff aggregator. We assume that the optimal common external tariff will keep three tariff bands and the same distribution of HS6 lines in these three bands as the current distribution. The availability of detailed data allows us to keep detailed information to feed the model, and thus to make more accurate estimates. Compared to the current tariff bands, the optimal common external tariff implies less tariff dispersion and a higher average tariff. This common external tariff maximizes the total welfare of the region. The common external tariff that maximizes the welfare of each member of the region is different: larger for Kenya, the largest country in the zone, and smaller for the other countries, including Rwanda, the smallest country in the zone. The adoption of this common external tariff is a Pareto-superior reform. However, if there is perfect mobility of factors between countries in the zone, divergence of interest about optimal trade is larger: if the optimal common external tariff which maximizes regional welfare is implemented, the GDP increases in the largest country, but it decreases in the smallest countries.
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spelling CGSpace1430212024-10-25T07:54:03Z On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Traoré, Fousseini common markets economic unions trade tariffs communities We study the determination of a common external tariff for African customs unions, using the case of the EAC. We use trade and tariff data at the HS6 level and a multi-sector multi-country computable general equilibrium model with the consistent tariff aggregator. We assume that the optimal common external tariff will keep three tariff bands and the same distribution of HS6 lines in these three bands as the current distribution. The availability of detailed data allows us to keep detailed information to feed the model, and thus to make more accurate estimates. Compared to the current tariff bands, the optimal common external tariff implies less tariff dispersion and a higher average tariff. This common external tariff maximizes the total welfare of the region. The common external tariff that maximizes the welfare of each member of the region is different: larger for Kenya, the largest country in the zone, and smaller for the other countries, including Rwanda, the smallest country in the zone. The adoption of this common external tariff is a Pareto-superior reform. However, if there is perfect mobility of factors between countries in the zone, divergence of interest about optimal trade is larger: if the optimal common external tariff which maximizes regional welfare is implemented, the GDP increases in the largest country, but it decreases in the smallest countries. 2021-12-31 2024-05-22T12:11:34Z 2024-05-22T12:11:34Z Conference Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/143021 en Open Access Global Trade Analysis Project Bouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David; and Traore, Fousseini. 2021. On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union. Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=6384
spellingShingle common markets
economic unions
trade
tariffs
communities
Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Traoré, Fousseini
On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title_full On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title_fullStr On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title_full_unstemmed On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title_short On the optimality of common external tariffs in Africa: Evidence from the EAC customs union
title_sort on the optimality of common external tariffs in africa evidence from the eac customs union
topic common markets
economic unions
trade
tariffs
communities
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/143021
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AT traorefousseini ontheoptimalityofcommonexternaltariffsinafricaevidencefromtheeaccustomsunion