Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China
Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs. A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized targeting is the existence of elite capture. China has recently implemented a nation...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142718 |
| _version_ | 1855530035227656192 |
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| author | Cheng, Xiao-yu Wang, Jian-ying Chen, Kevin Z. |
| author_browse | Chen, Kevin Z. Cheng, Xiao-yu Wang, Jian-ying |
| author_facet | Cheng, Xiao-yu Wang, Jian-ying Chen, Kevin Z. |
| author_sort | Cheng, Xiao-yu |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs. A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized targeting is the existence of elite capture. China has recently implemented a nationwide decentralized poverty targeting program, the targeted poverty alleviation (TPA) policy, to achieve the national goal of eliminating absolute poverty by the end of 2020. As the largest decentralized poverty targeting program in the world, TPA’s successful implementation was believed to be threatened by elite capture in some earlier reports. Since 2015, a targeting correction mechanism, called “follow-up checks” policy, has been introduced. With the “follow-up checks” policy, the elites and other ineligible households who receive benefits under TPA were removed from the program. This paper investigates the elite capture phenomenon in TPA using village census data from a poverty-stricken county in 2017 – two years after implementing the “follow-up checks” policy. We find no evidence of elite capture in TPA. The elites are unlikely to become beneficiaries or receive more benefits than non-elites. Our results contradict earlier findings that reported elite capture in TPA. We argue that the reason is the accountability emphasized by the central government in the “follow-up checks” policy. Our findings imply that having proper accountability is critical for improving targeting performance by global antipoverty initiatives. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace142718 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences |
| publisherStr | Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1427182025-12-08T10:06:44Z Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China Cheng, Xiao-yu Wang, Jian-ying Chen, Kevin Z. policies poverty alleviation elite capture decentralization poverty elites rural areas accountability Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs. A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized targeting is the existence of elite capture. China has recently implemented a nationwide decentralized poverty targeting program, the targeted poverty alleviation (TPA) policy, to achieve the national goal of eliminating absolute poverty by the end of 2020. As the largest decentralized poverty targeting program in the world, TPA’s successful implementation was believed to be threatened by elite capture in some earlier reports. Since 2015, a targeting correction mechanism, called “follow-up checks” policy, has been introduced. With the “follow-up checks” policy, the elites and other ineligible households who receive benefits under TPA were removed from the program. This paper investigates the elite capture phenomenon in TPA using village census data from a poverty-stricken county in 2017 – two years after implementing the “follow-up checks” policy. We find no evidence of elite capture in TPA. The elites are unlikely to become beneficiaries or receive more benefits than non-elites. Our results contradict earlier findings that reported elite capture in TPA. We argue that the reason is the accountability emphasized by the central government in the “follow-up checks” policy. Our findings imply that having proper accountability is critical for improving targeting performance by global antipoverty initiatives. 2021-04-01 2024-05-22T12:10:56Z 2024-05-22T12:10:56Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142718 en Open Access Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences Cheng, Xiao-yu; Wang, Jian-ying; and Chen, Kevin Z. 2021. Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China. Journal of Integrative Agriculture 20(4): 880-890. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2095-3119(20)63444-X |
| spellingShingle | policies poverty alleviation elite capture decentralization poverty elites rural areas accountability Cheng, Xiao-yu Wang, Jian-ying Chen, Kevin Z. Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title | Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title_full | Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title_fullStr | Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title_full_unstemmed | Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title_short | Elite capture, the “follow-up checks” policy, and the targeted poverty alleviation program: Evidence from rural Western China |
| title_sort | elite capture the follow up checks policy and the targeted poverty alleviation program evidence from rural western china |
| topic | policies poverty alleviation elite capture decentralization poverty elites rural areas accountability |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142718 |
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