Group lending with peer selection and moral hazard
The theory on group lending suggests that joint liability induces borrowers to form homogeneous groups based on their risk types, which alleviates adverse selection and contributes to the success of microcredit schemes. We extend this theory by allowing individuals to differ both in their exogenous...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Scientific Research Publishing, Inc.
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/141287 |
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