Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh
Adoption of high-quality yet more expensive agricultural inputs remains low, in part because most inputs are experience goods: before purchase, buyers observe only price—not quality—providing sellers with opportunities to cheat on quality. Our lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh replicates mar...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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International Food Policy Research Institute
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/140843 |
| _version_ | 1855526954844815360 |
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| author | de Brauw, Alan Kramer, Berber |
| author_browse | Kramer, Berber de Brauw, Alan |
| author_facet | de Brauw, Alan Kramer, Berber |
| author_sort | de Brauw, Alan |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Adoption of high-quality yet more expensive agricultural inputs remains low, in part because most inputs are experience goods: before purchase, buyers observe only price—not quality—providing sellers with opportunities to cheat on quality. Our lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh replicates markets for such inputs, with input retailers (sellers) choosing price and quality, and farmers (buyers) choosing from which seller to purchase inputs. We analyze market behavior, including buyers’ trust and sellers’ reciprocity, and study the effects of buyer-driven accreditation and loyalty rewards for accredited sellers of high-quality products. Trust and reciprocity remain low: Sellers provide mostly low-quality products, and buyers reveal low demand for more expensive, high-quality inputs. Accrediting sellers when their buyers are satisfied leads to higher input quality and more repeat purchases, but only when combined with loyalty rewards, because buyers’ quality signals are weak and do not incentivize sellers to change their behavior. We conclude that small incentives are effective at improving seller behavior, but this behavior change does not necessarily enhance quality signals and farmer welfare. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace140843 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1408432025-12-02T21:02:52Z Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh de Brauw, Alan Kramer, Berber field experimentation consumer behaviour farm inputs markets behaviour merchants Adoption of high-quality yet more expensive agricultural inputs remains low, in part because most inputs are experience goods: before purchase, buyers observe only price—not quality—providing sellers with opportunities to cheat on quality. Our lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh replicates markets for such inputs, with input retailers (sellers) choosing price and quality, and farmers (buyers) choosing from which seller to purchase inputs. We analyze market behavior, including buyers’ trust and sellers’ reciprocity, and study the effects of buyer-driven accreditation and loyalty rewards for accredited sellers of high-quality products. Trust and reciprocity remain low: Sellers provide mostly low-quality products, and buyers reveal low demand for more expensive, high-quality inputs. Accrediting sellers when their buyers are satisfied leads to higher input quality and more repeat purchases, but only when combined with loyalty rewards, because buyers’ quality signals are weak and do not incentivize sellers to change their behavior. We conclude that small incentives are effective at improving seller behavior, but this behavior change does not necessarily enhance quality signals and farmer welfare. 2022-06-01 2024-04-12T13:36:44Z 2024-04-12T13:36:44Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/140843 en https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105445 https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.134157 Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute de Brauw, Alan; and Kramer, Berber. 2022. Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh. IFPRI Discussion Paper 2124. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.135928. |
| spellingShingle | field experimentation consumer behaviour farm inputs markets behaviour merchants de Brauw, Alan Kramer, Berber Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title | Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title_full | Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title_fullStr | Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title_full_unstemmed | Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title_short | Improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Bangladesh |
| title_sort | improving trust and reciprocity in agricultural input markets a lab in the field experiment in bangladesh |
| topic | field experimentation consumer behaviour farm inputs markets behaviour merchants |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/140843 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT debrauwalan improvingtrustandreciprocityinagriculturalinputmarketsalabinthefieldexperimentinbangladesh AT kramerberber improvingtrustandreciprocityinagriculturalinputmarketsalabinthefieldexperimentinbangladesh |