Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications
Collective Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), where forest users receive compensation conditional on group rather than individual performance, are an increasingly used policy instrument to reduce tropical deforestation. However, implementing effective, (cost) efficient and equitable (3E) collect...
| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2022
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/120395 |
| _version_ | 1855526222966030336 |
|---|---|
| author | Naime, J. Angelsen, A. Molina Garzón, A. Carrilho, C.D. Selviana, V. Demarchi, G. Duchelle, Amy E. Martius, C. |
| author_browse | Angelsen, A. Carrilho, C.D. Demarchi, G. Duchelle, Amy E. Martius, C. Molina Garzón, A. Naime, J. Selviana, V. |
| author_facet | Naime, J. Angelsen, A. Molina Garzón, A. Carrilho, C.D. Selviana, V. Demarchi, G. Duchelle, Amy E. Martius, C. |
| author_sort | Naime, J. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Collective Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), where forest users receive compensation conditional on group rather than individual performance, are an increasingly used policy instrument to reduce tropical deforestation. However, implementing effective, (cost) efficient and equitable (3E) collective PES is challenging because individuals have an incentive to free ride on others’ conservation actions. Few comparative studies exist on how different enforcement strategies can improve collective PES performance. We conducted a framed field experiment in Brazil, Indonesia and Peru to evaluate how three different strategies to contain the local free-rider problem perform in terms of the 3Es: (i) Public monitoring of individual deforestation, (ii) internal, peer-to-peer sanctions (Community enforcement) and (iii) external sanctions (Government enforcement). We also examined how inequality in wealth, framed as differences in deforestation capacity, affects policy performance. We find that introducing individual level sanctions can improve the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of collective PES, but there is no silver bullet that consistently improves all 3Es across country sites. Public monitoring reduced deforestation and improved the equity of the program in sites with stronger history of collective action. External sanctions provided the strongest and most robust improvement in the 3Es. While internal, peer enforcement can significantly reduce free riding, it does not improve the program’s efficiency, and thus participants’ earnings. The sanctioning mechanisms failed to systematically improve the equitable distribution of benefits due to the ineffectiveness of punishments to target the largest free-riders. Inequality in wealth increased group deforestation and reduced the efficiency of Community enforcement in Indonesia but had no effect in the other two country sites. Factors explaining differences across country sites include the history of collective action and land tenure systems. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace120395 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| publisherStr | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1203952025-10-26T13:01:28Z Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications Naime, J. Angelsen, A. Molina Garzón, A. Carrilho, C.D. Selviana, V. Demarchi, G. Duchelle, Amy E. Martius, C. ecosystem services deforestation policy analysis law enforcement Collective Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), where forest users receive compensation conditional on group rather than individual performance, are an increasingly used policy instrument to reduce tropical deforestation. However, implementing effective, (cost) efficient and equitable (3E) collective PES is challenging because individuals have an incentive to free ride on others’ conservation actions. Few comparative studies exist on how different enforcement strategies can improve collective PES performance. We conducted a framed field experiment in Brazil, Indonesia and Peru to evaluate how three different strategies to contain the local free-rider problem perform in terms of the 3Es: (i) Public monitoring of individual deforestation, (ii) internal, peer-to-peer sanctions (Community enforcement) and (iii) external sanctions (Government enforcement). We also examined how inequality in wealth, framed as differences in deforestation capacity, affects policy performance. We find that introducing individual level sanctions can improve the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of collective PES, but there is no silver bullet that consistently improves all 3Es across country sites. Public monitoring reduced deforestation and improved the equity of the program in sites with stronger history of collective action. External sanctions provided the strongest and most robust improvement in the 3Es. While internal, peer enforcement can significantly reduce free riding, it does not improve the program’s efficiency, and thus participants’ earnings. The sanctioning mechanisms failed to systematically improve the equitable distribution of benefits due to the ineffectiveness of punishments to target the largest free-riders. Inequality in wealth increased group deforestation and reduced the efficiency of Community enforcement in Indonesia but had no effect in the other two country sites. Factors explaining differences across country sites include the history of collective action and land tenure systems. 2022-05 2022-08-02T03:11:09Z 2022-08-02T03:11:09Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/120395 en Open Access Elsevier Naime, J., Angelsen, A., Molina-Garzón, A., Carrilho, C.D., Selviana, V., Demarchi, G., Duchelle, A.E. and Martius, C. 2022. Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications. Global Environmental Change 74: 102520. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102520 |
| spellingShingle | ecosystem services deforestation policy analysis law enforcement Naime, J. Angelsen, A. Molina Garzón, A. Carrilho, C.D. Selviana, V. Demarchi, G. Duchelle, Amy E. Martius, C. Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title | Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title_full | Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title_fullStr | Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title_full_unstemmed | Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title_short | Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications |
| title_sort | enforcement and inequality in collective pes to reduce tropical deforestation effectiveness efficiency and equity implications |
| topic | ecosystem services deforestation policy analysis law enforcement |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/120395 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT naimej enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT angelsena enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT molinagarzona enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT carrilhocd enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT selvianav enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT demarchig enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT duchelleamye enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications AT martiusc enforcementandinequalityincollectivepestoreducetropicaldeforestationeffectivenessefficiencyandequityimplications |