Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas

The design of protected areas, whether marine or terrestrial, rarely considers how people respond to the imposition of no-take sites with complete or incomplete enforcement. Consequently, these protected areas may fail to achieve their intended goal. We present and solve a spatial bio-economic model...

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Main Authors: Albers, H.J., Preonas, L., Capitán, T., Robinson, E.J.Z., Madrigal-Ballestero, R.
Format: Artículo
Language:Inglés
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00472-7
https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/10302
id RepoCATIE10302
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spelling RepoCATIE103022022-08-05T18:55:57Z Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas Albers, H.J. Preonas, L. Capitán, T. Robinson, E.J.Z. Madrigal-Ballestero, R. AREAS MARINAS PROTEGIDAS ECOLOGIA DINAMICA PECES TOMA DE DECISIONES SOLUCION PARAMETROS GERENTES POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES PAISAJE The design of protected areas, whether marine or terrestrial, rarely considers how people respond to the imposition of no-take sites with complete or incomplete enforcement. Consequently, these protected areas may fail to achieve their intended goal. We present and solve a spatial bio-economic model in which a manager chooses the optimal location, size, and enforcement level of a marine protected area (MPA). This manager acts as a Stackelberg leader, and her choices consider villagers’ best response to the MPA in a spatial Nash equilibrium of fishing site and effort decisions. Relevant to lower income country settings but general to other settings, we incorporate limited enforcement budgets, distance costs of traveling to fishing sites, and labor allocation to onshore wage opportunities. The optimal MPA varies markedly across alternative manager goals and budget sizes, but always induce changes in villagers’ decisions as a function of distance, dispersal, and wage. We consider MPA managers with ecological conservation goals and with economic goals, and identify the shortcomings of several common manager decision rules, including those focused on: (1) fishery outcomes rather than broader economic goals, (2) fish stocks at MPA sites rather than across the full marinescape, (3) absolute levels rather than additional values, and (4) costless enforcement. Our results demonstrate that such naïve or overly narrow decision rules can lead to inefficient MPA designs that miss economic and conservation opportunities. 2021-02-15T04:49:04Z 2021-02-15T04:49:04Z 2020 Artículo https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00472-7 https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/10302 en Environmental and Resource Economics, Volumen 77, (2020) páginas 229–269 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf
institution Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza
collection Repositorio CATIE
language Inglés
topic AREAS MARINAS PROTEGIDAS
ECOLOGIA
DINAMICA
PECES
TOMA DE DECISIONES
SOLUCION
PARAMETROS
GERENTES
POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES
PAISAJE
spellingShingle AREAS MARINAS PROTEGIDAS
ECOLOGIA
DINAMICA
PECES
TOMA DE DECISIONES
SOLUCION
PARAMETROS
GERENTES
POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES
PAISAJE
Albers, H.J.
Preonas, L.
Capitán, T.
Robinson, E.J.Z.
Madrigal-Ballestero, R.
Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
description The design of protected areas, whether marine or terrestrial, rarely considers how people respond to the imposition of no-take sites with complete or incomplete enforcement. Consequently, these protected areas may fail to achieve their intended goal. We present and solve a spatial bio-economic model in which a manager chooses the optimal location, size, and enforcement level of a marine protected area (MPA). This manager acts as a Stackelberg leader, and her choices consider villagers’ best response to the MPA in a spatial Nash equilibrium of fishing site and effort decisions. Relevant to lower income country settings but general to other settings, we incorporate limited enforcement budgets, distance costs of traveling to fishing sites, and labor allocation to onshore wage opportunities. The optimal MPA varies markedly across alternative manager goals and budget sizes, but always induce changes in villagers’ decisions as a function of distance, dispersal, and wage. We consider MPA managers with ecological conservation goals and with economic goals, and identify the shortcomings of several common manager decision rules, including those focused on: (1) fishery outcomes rather than broader economic goals, (2) fish stocks at MPA sites rather than across the full marinescape, (3) absolute levels rather than additional values, and (4) costless enforcement. Our results demonstrate that such naïve or overly narrow decision rules can lead to inefficient MPA designs that miss economic and conservation opportunities.
format Artículo
author Albers, H.J.
Preonas, L.
Capitán, T.
Robinson, E.J.Z.
Madrigal-Ballestero, R.
author_facet Albers, H.J.
Preonas, L.
Capitán, T.
Robinson, E.J.Z.
Madrigal-Ballestero, R.
author_sort Albers, H.J.
title Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
title_short Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
title_full Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
title_fullStr Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected Areas
title_sort optimal siting, sizing, and enforcement of marine protected areas
publishDate 2021
url https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00472-7
https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/10302
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AT capitant optimalsitingsizingandenforcementofmarineprotectedareas
AT robinsonejz optimalsitingsizingandenforcementofmarineprotectedareas
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